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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHO KILLED MANAGED CARE? A POLICY WHODUNIT

PETER D. JACOBSON*

INTRODUCTION
The Accusation
When I first heard the news that managed care was dead, I could hardly
believe it. After all, I was enrolled in a managed care plan and had not
received any notice that the form of my health care coverage had changed. Of
somewhat greater concern, I was worried about what my future health care
would be and how much it would cost.
After the initial shock faded, I decided I needed to explore a few questions.
Most importantly, is managed care really dead? While I was aware that
physicians, patients, and the media often reviled managed care, I had no idea it
was in such dire trouble. If so, who or what killed managed care and what
would replace it? As we will see, this question turned out to be the focus of
my inquiry.
The Crime Scene
As crime scenes go, this one was eerily silent and devoid of direct clues. I
looked around, but I was unable to find the body (the corpus delecti). In most
crime scenes, there are grieving relatives and friends to console the survivors,
but no one came to mourn managed care. Or, if there were mourners, they
were certainly doing so in private.
Nonetheless, some circumstantial evidence of managed care’s putative
demise was not hard to see. The most obvious was the return of double-digit
inflation in health care costs. One of managed care’s greatest successes,
restraining the growth of health care costs, was in jeopardy, along with
managed care’s long-term viability. Perhaps more ominously, managed care
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organizations (“MCOs”) seemed to be retrenching on their most coveted cost
containment programs, such as requiring preauthorization for expensive
medical procedures, limiting direct access to plan specialists, and contracting
only with physicians and physician groups meeting the plan’s quality standards
(known as selective contracting). Under considerable assault from managed
care subscribers, the industry was forced to adopt point-of-service plans that
relaxed some of the more stringent cost controls.
The assault, however, was not limited to patients. In fact, there has been a
backlash from the public and much of the medical community against the
perceived deficiencies in the managed care approach.1 The signs of backlash
were evident at the crime scene. But the problem was that there were too
many participants to isolate anyone who might have led the backlash and
committed the murder.
Not just patients, but physicians, hospital
administrators, judges, politicians, and the media were all complicit in the
backlash. How to sort out each of their respective contributions promised to be
a major problem of this investigation. Indeed, how did the managed care
industry ever manage to engender such widespread hostility? Curiously,
despite the forces arrayed against it, the perpetrators of the backlash have not
been able to enact the one piece of legislation designed to address the
perceived deficiencies: the patients’ bill of rights. This bill would guarantee
patient access to independent grievance processes and direct access to
specialists. This failure should give one pause before declaring managed
care’s demise.
One final piece of evidence should be noted. Under cover of the managed
care backlash, physicians and hospitals began to reassert their prerogatives.
With the erosion of stringent cost controls, physicians gained greater leverage
in clinical decisions. Likewise, hospital administrators pushed through
payment increases that had been all but impossible during the few years that
managed care was ascendant.
The absence of clues and witnesses made it difficult to identify the
perpetrator and the motives. As I would soon learn, there were plenty of
suspects with myriad motives for wishing managed care’s demise. But at this
point, both the perpetrator and the motive were neither identifiable nor
obvious. Beyond that, it was not even clear how managed care died. What act
killed it? Three possibilities occurred to me. First, that it was simply a death
by natural causes. This made sense because the crime scene lacked any indicia
of foul play. From that observation, a second possibility followed—that
managed care died of self-inflicted wounds. Given my sense that managed
care offered a good product that had not been implemented as well as it might
have been, this seemed a strong possibility.
1. For a comprehensive discussion of the backlash, see the articles collected in 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 653-1420 (1999).
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Yet, I could not rule out a third, and perhaps more intriguing scenario—
that managed care was murdered. At first, this seemed a bit far-fetched. As
the behemoth of health care delivery since the mid-1990s, it would be difficult
for any suspect to have the means to slay such a large enterprise. And even if
the actor had the means, how could this be done so silently as to leave no overt
clues? With all of the public and scholarly attention to managed care, patients’
rights, and so forth, it seems preposterous to think that managed care could be
killed so effectively without leaving a trace as to the killer’s identity. And
yet. . . .
The Suspects
It did not take long to conjure up a list of suspects who had no love for
managed care and might even revel in its demise. But would they actually be
so brazen as to commit or be complicit in murdering managed care?
Physicians and patients were the most obvious suspects. Each group had
reason to kill managed care—physicians for loss of autonomy and patients for
the perceived loss of access to needed services. But we cannot forget about
politicians. Both state and federal legislators had their own reasons for
controlling managed care. The judicial system would be at the top of some
observers’ lists of suspects. Since the judiciary was initially hostile to
incursions on physician autonomy, several scholars argued that the courts
would undermine managed care’s cost containment initiatives.
A prime suspect could well be the media. From the managed care
industry’s perspective, the media irresponsibly portrayed a few horror stories
as indicative of all managed care operations. In the industry’s view, the media
has ignored managed care’s positive attributes of being a needed corrective to
the excesses of the fee-for-service system.
Less obvious suspects included health insurers, employers, and hospitals.
As we will see, each of these actors has mixed motives for killing managed
care. Although health insurers might benefit from less competition, they need
to worry that the carnage would spill over to them. Employers certainly want
to see lower health care costs, but they also want to satisfy their employees. If
employers receive too many complaints about managed care, their support for
cost containment programs may quickly attenuate. Hospitals also have mixed
motives. As contractors for managed care patients, hospitals have an interest
in cooperating with the managed care industry. But as hospital revenues
declined under pressure from MCOs, hospitals needed to fight back to
maintain their economic viability.
Each of these suspects has reason to celebrate the end of managed care.
Could any of them individually kill managed care? Probably not. More likely,
perhaps they secretly colluded to destroy managed care. Even if there was no
collusion, there may well have been support as each suspect attacked one piece
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of managed care’s operations. At a minimum, no one defended managed care
against these attacks.
The Background
Anyone with even a passing interest in health care delivery learns
immediately that the U.S. health care system is in trouble. Take, for example,
the three main public policy concerns of costs, quality, and access. After a
short period during the 1990s in which cost increases were limited, health care
costs are once again escalating at double-digit rates. Despite ongoing efforts to
improve overall quality of care, many observers complain that quality remains
a problem. And the rising number of people without health insurance remains
an intractable social problem.
From the rise of modern medicine to prominence after World War II until
the early 1990s, health care delivery and health policy were largely dominated
by physicians.2 In the fee-for-service model, there was very little interference
on physician autonomy from payers, hospital administrators, or patients. The
costs of care mattered little to either patients or physicians. Except for the
premium charge, the entire health care bill was paid by a third party insurer.
No one in the system had an incentive to control costs.3
Managed care revolutionized health care delivery by combining the
financing and medical (clinical) aspects into one package.4 Instead of paying a
fee for each service, the patient subscribes to a managed care plan for a
monthly fee that covers and provides a defined set of benefits. For each visit
or service, patients make an additional co-payment of $10 or $20. At the heart
of managed care is the promise that a new approach could lower costs by
imposing restraints on the amount of care provided without sacrificing quality
of care. To do so, managed care initiated the widespread use of costcontainment practices designed to reduce the costs of health care by
encouraging providers to limit medical treatment. These practices range from
aggressive utilization management to capitated funding arrangements,
limitations on choice of providers, limitations on benefits (for example, ten
physical therapy visits), exclusive contracting arrangements, and other

2. For an excellent and thorough history, see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).

3. Economists term this “moral hazard.” See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
AMERICAN MEDICINE 290-91 (1982). Moral hazard is defined as changes in behavior as a
result of insurance or other mechanism protecting individuals from the consequences of their
actions. An example of a moral hazard is that some will drive recklessly if they think that safety
devices, such as anti-lock brakes, will protect them.
4. This is a far more transformative departure than the shift from in-office physician care to
hospitals as the locus of health care delivery because it changes all aspects of the health care
enterprise. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).

OF
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financial incentives such as bonuses and withholds. While these techniques
are now also used by commercial insurers, managed care providers have been
more aggressive in using them to reduce costs.
Many commentators believed that managed care would be the savior—the
free market alternative to the governmental takeover by the Clinton
Administration’s proposed Health Security Act. With hindsight, it seems clear
that the managed care concept, however sound, suffered from excessively high
expectations that were impossible to meet. Those expectations were most
manifest during the 1994 debate over the Clinton Administration’s proposed
Health Security Act. At the heart of the debate was the lack of consensus over
whether health care should be left to the private sector to be run by
marketplace rules, or should involve significant regulatory oversight. After the
media creatively pilloried the Health Security Act as a governmental takeover
of the health care system, the Act was resoundingly defeated.
In retrospect, it seems clear that in the 1994 policy debate, the country
decided to religion market mechanisms to shape our health care delivery
system as opposed to relying on government to redress the perceived
deficiencies of the health care system. For a time, the market indeed achieved
what competitive markets are best at doing, relentlessly reducing the cost
excesses of the old health care order. But reliance on the market had other
consequences the public found troublesome, and managed care was declared
dead.5 Whether dead or merely dying (reports of its death may well be
premature), a crime (murder or at least attempted murder) was committed that I
am determined to solve. Keep in mind that, even if managed care disappears
tomorrow, the health policy dilemma will remain what it was at the start of the
managed care era: how to contain the high cost of health care without unduly
limiting individual access to needed health care services.
THE SUSPECTS: MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY
This story has numerous suspects, but no heroes. Even the sleuths, the
academic community (and other health policy observers), have not always
clarified the complex developments that seem overwhelming to most patients.
Nonetheless, the job of explaining who killed managed care is well-suited to
the academic community. Before determining who killed managed care, I
analyzed each suspect’s motives and opportunities for wanting to see managed
care eliminated. As we will see, finding many suspects with both motive and
opportunity was relatively easy. Eliminating suspects and finding the true
culprit proved much more difficult.
5. James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2623 (2001);
Katherine Swartz, The Death of Managed Care as We Know It, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
1201, 1202 (1999). This claim is ahead of itself. There are still several large MCOs, including
Kaiser-Permanence, United Healthcare, Aetna, etc. Smaller plans may be more vulnerable.
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Physicians
The logical starting place among the numerous suspects for the
investigation is with physicians. Historically, physicians have dominated,
defined, and shaped health care delivery. But what exactly is their relationship
to the victim? What would they gain from the demise of managed care?
What, in short, is their motive?
Motive. Managed care changes the physician’s role in health care delivery
in ways that provide a clear motive for wanting managed care to disappear.
Although many physicians have adapted to the managed care environment, the
profession, as a whole, remains resistant to managed care because it upsets the
profession’s traditional control over medical practice.
Historically, the attributes of medical practice included professional
dominance, where physicians controlled the allocation of health care resources.
At the heart of the clinical encounter was professional autonomy—physicians
alone made medical decisions, with insurers paying for the recommended
treatment. Physicians alone controlled access to private health information
upon which medical decisions were made. In addition, physicians achieved
considerable social status and economic attainment. All of this was diminished
by managed care.
In a relatively short period of time, managed care challenged and
undermined each of these core doctrines. Most importantly, the physicianpatient relationship is no longer sacrosanct. Physicians no longer dominate
health care delivery, but are subordinate to the managed care industry.
Concepts such as preauthorization, utilization review, and economic incentives
to reduce the cost of health care compromised physician autonomy. Clinical
decisions must be “authorized” based on coverage limits, formularies, or
worse, the opinion of an authorizing managed care agent (usually a nonphysician, nurse or clerk, for the initial approval). One scholar refers to this
process as the “1-800-MOTHER-MAY-I model of telephone approval.”6 The
process shakes the foundation of physician autonomy, imposes resourceconsuming and vexing bureaucracy on medical practice, and necessitates a
frustrating exercise for the practitioner. But physicians are still responsible
both legally and ethically to act in a patient’s best interests. This squeeze
between patient demands for more care and MCOs’ demands to reduce costs
created a fundamental ethical dilemma not present in fee-for-service medicine.
Another factor is the capitation method of reimbursement initiated by
managed care. Under capitation, a physician (or physicians’ group) receives a
flat, per member, per month fee to manage the care. If there is a surplus, the
physician retains the money; but if there is a shortfall, the physician absorbs
the risk. Aside from the inevitable squeeze capitation places on physicians’
6. Harold S. Luft, Why are Physicians So Upset About Managed Care?, 24 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 957, 963 (1999).
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revenue, the physician faces increasing liability exposure to the patient without
being able to control how resources are allocated.
In view of these changes, it is hardly surprising that physician satisfaction
substantially declined. Research indicates that primary care physicians’
perception of clinical autonomy is negatively correlated to the proportion of
Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) patients in their practices.7
“[O]nly 18 percent of practicing physicians indicated that they held a positive
view of the changes occurring in the health care system.”8 Only sixty-five
percent (65%) of physicians surveyed expressed satisfaction with practicing in
a managed care HMO environment.9 Employed physicians in group or staff
model HMOs are not statistically more dissatisfied than independently
practicing physicians. Primary care physicians whose income is derived from
capitated managed care contracts are significantly more dissatisfied than
primary care physicians who do not receive capitated income.10
Opportunity. There is no shortage of evidence of grumbling, complaining,
and effective character assassination by physicians about managed care. Nor is
there any shortage of opportunities to sabotage the managed care. But does it
add up to a deathblow? Although it seems unlikely that physicians retained the
political or social power to single-handedly kill managed care, it seems very
plausible that physician opposition to managed care’s cost containment
initiatives contributed significantly to the industry’s demise.
At a minimum, physicians provided some of the most vociferous
opposition to managed care that contributed to the public backlash beginning
in the mid-1990s. No one has attempted to quantify physicians’ influence on
the backlash, but a look at the activities, policies, politics, and positions of the
American Medical Association (“AMA”) is quite revealing. The medical
profession historically has taken the position that it alone is trained and
sufficiently competent to police physicians and, consequently, medical policy
must derive solely from the physician community. The AMA has a long and
distinguished track record of politically championing these interests of the
profession. As a result, the AMA has opposed non-physician control over
medical decisions, dating from the emergence of pre-paid health care in the
1930s and continuing through the advent of managed care. Its current strategy
includes a web-based managed care complaint box for physicians to file their
managed care woes to serve as evidence in the on-going feud.11
7. Sharon B. Buchbinder et al., Managed Care and Primary Care Physicians’ Overall
Career Satisfaction, 28 J. HEALTH FIN. 35, 36-37 (2001).
8. Mike Magee & Mohammadreza Hojat, Impact of Health Care System on Physicians’
Discontent, 26 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 357, 358 (2001).
9. Id.
10. Buchbinder et al., supra note 7, at 42.
11. Amy Snow Landa, AMA to Catalog Doctors’ Woes on Health Plans, AM. MED. NEWS,
Dec. 10, 2001, at 6.
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Yet the AMA’s ability to block the erosion of physician autonomy and the
rise of managed care has diminished steadily since the 1970s. The diminished
political clout limits the profession’s ability to enact legislation blocking
managed care’s cost containment programs or protecting physician autonomy.
As one scholar notes, “Once deferential to professional guidance in
policymaking, politicians now have begun to question and even alter organized
The outcome was a diminution of
medicine’s political stances.”12
membership, solidarity, and political allies. State chapters, medical societies,
and competing organizations stepped in to fill niche vacuums. By the 1980s,
when managed care was wreaking havoc on physicians’ practices and incomes,
the AMA no longer wielded the political clout to forge alliances and bring
about the death of managed care.
The result of this loss of political power can be seen at both state and
federal legislatures, which limits the profession’s opportunity to sabotage
managed care. For example, despite the AMA’s persistent support for a
federal patients’ bill of rights (which would help restore physician autonomy),
Congress failed to enact a federal patients’ bill of rights. At the state level,
however, physicians have been somewhat more successful in enacting
legislation that protects their interests.13
That is not to say that the physician community, and even the AMA, has
not attempted to undermine managed care. Physicians responded to the
business of managed care with business tactics of their own. The earliest
managed care visionaries described a system with a rich, broad group of
primary and specialty care providers who assume the responsibility for
comprehensive, high quality care of a defined population.14 Unfortunately, the
realization of that model left the majority of providers, especially Primary Care
Physicians (“PCPs”), who were in solo or small practices, disenfranchised and
impotent in negotiations with behemoth insurers-turned-MCOs. These
physicians abandoned their entrepreneurial practices, often under pressure and
with deep regret, and merged with hospitals in Integrated Delivery Systems
(“IDS”), Physician Hospital Organizations (“PHO”), Independent Physician
Associations (“IPA”), and a plethora of other larger organizational forms. This
gave physicians the scale and scope necessary to get in the game with the
giants like Aetna, United Healthcare, and Cigna. Eventually, physicians
12. Mark Schlesinger, A Loss of Faith: The Sources of Reduced Political Legitimacy for the
American Medical Profession, 80 MILBANK Q. 185, 186 (2002). See also Mark A. Peterson,
From Trust to Political Power: Interest Groups, Public Choice, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 1145 (2001) (describing the political power and efficaciousness of the AMA
through the 1960s and the factors thereafter that disrupted the old power relationships).
13. See discussion infra pp. 382-83 regarding willing provider laws.
14. See Alain C. Enthoven & Carol B. Vorhaus, A Vision of Quality in Health Care
Delivery, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 45; Andy Pasternak, Jackson Hole Revisited, at
http://www.healthleaders.com/magazine/feature1.php?contentid=20048 (June 1, 2001).
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learned to effectively negotiate managed care contracts, but not without many
casualties in the learning process. More recently, the number of physicians
accepting capitation is in a downward trend and those that do accept capitation
are savvier than before.15 The trend away from capitation increased
physicians’ leverage against MCOs. As one managed care executive said, “We
asked our doctors to act like insurance companies; that didn’t work well.”16
Patients
The next most obvious suspects are managed care’s patients. They are at
the locus of all the disparate competing interests and are most affected by
managed care’s cost controls when they are vulnerable and needy. Could their
frustration have culminated in murder?
Motive. The horror stories about managed care’s deficiencies are easy to
find. A Kentucky woman with a precancerous cervical lesion successfully
sued her managed care company for more than $13 million, virtually all in
punitive damages, when the managed care company refused the ob-gyn’s
recommended treatment.17 A court granted class action status to a lawsuit
stemming “from improper denial of medical coverage” when a Prudential
Concurrent Review Nurse countermanded the patient’s physician’s orders for
ninety-six hours post-surgical hospitalization following removal of two tumors
weighing more than 3½ pounds.18 United Healthcare discontinued in-patient
coverage for a woman with a high-risk pregnancy in her last weeks contrary to
her wishes and her physician’s orders.19 Consequently, her baby died in utero,
but she was denied a C-section and must wait days to deliver her dead infant.20
Are these cases representative of most patients’ experiences? If they are, it
easily provides a motive for murder. Or are there other forces and factors that
cumulatively constitute a motive for murder? According to many observers,
15. J.A. Jacob, Fewer Physician Groups Accept Capitation, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 5, 2001,
at 20. Interestingly, recent data shows that although physicians are generally participating in
managed care capitation arrangements, those who do accept capitation are making more money
and their capitation income represents a larger portion of their total income. Ken Terry, Managed
Care: Could You Live Without It?, MED. ECON., Dec. 3, 2001, at 26.
16. Leigh Page, Capitation at the Crossroads, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 5, 2001, at 17,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_01/bisa0305.htm (Mar. 5, 2001)
(quoting Stanley Borg of Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Colorado). Of course,
physicians could refuse to participate in managed care arrangements, but few can afford to do so.
17. Robert Lowes, Straightforward UR—or a “Machine of Denial”?, MED. ECON., May 8,
2000, at 180.
18. AIS Managed Care, HMO Lawsuit Watch: Batas v. The Prudentail [sic] Ins. Co., at
http://www.aishealth.com/ManagedCare/HMOLawsuitWatch/Bates.html; Batas v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 724 N.Y.S.2d 3, 9-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
19. Melanie Eversley, Grieving Mom an Icon for Patients’ Rights; Out of Baby’s Death
Came HMO Crusade, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 23, 2002, at 1A.
20. Id.
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actual health outcomes—an attempt at measuring quality of care—are not
appreciably different between MCOs and fee-for-services providers. As one
scholar notes, “[n]or is it true that we’re any sicker now from all this managed
care and denial of services and so on.”21 If this is correct, what is the source of
patients’ state of mind regarding their experiences with managed care?
Several factors contribute to patients’ perceived antipathy. For one, as
discussed below, media reports tend to emphasize managed care’s failures
without describing managed care’s successes. For another, many people may
derive their aversion to managed care based on reports from others rather than
on personal experiences.22 Beyond these considerations, the shift from fee-forservice medicine to managed care has been jarring for many patients. In
contrast to the relatively simple world before managed care, where physicians
recommended treatment and insurers paid, managed care offers patients a
bewildering array of acronyms and concepts that even specialists sometimes
have trouble characterizing. In fee-for-service, patients expected almost
unlimited care where cost was rarely an issue (for those with insurance
coverage). As will be described below, the managed care industry did little to
explain the concept to the public and provided the public with little or no input
into the design or implementation of cost control programs. And the industry
has been remiss in not offering formal grievance mechanisms for patients to
contest delayed or denied care.
Polls vary widely in measuring patient satisfaction with managed care. A
review of health care policy public opinion polls over a fifty-year period
concludes:
[T]he American public has conflicting views about the nation’s health policy.
They report much dissatisfaction with the health care system and with private
health insurance and managed care companies, and they indicate general
support of a national health plan. However, most Americans remain satisfied
with their current medical arrangements, do not trust the federal government to
do what is right, and do not favor a single-payer type of national health plan.
The review also finds that confidence in the leaders of medicine has declined
but that most Americans maintain trust in the honesty and ethical standards of
individual physicians.23

21. Gina Kolata, A Conversation with: Victor Fuchs; An Economist’s View of Health Care
Reform, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at F6. Other prominent analysts agree. See, e.g., Robert H.
Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of Care?: A
Survey of Recent Studies Shows Mixed Results on Managed Care Plan Performance, HEALTH
AFF., May-June 1997, at 7.
22. Gail R. Wilensky, What’s Behind the Public’s Backlash?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
1015, 1016 (1999).
23. Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, Americans’ Views on Health Policy: A Fifty-Year
Historical Perspective, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 33.
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Given these somewhat conflicting viewpoints, there are, nonetheless, some
noteworthy consistencies. One study found that among 827 Californians there
was a correlation of lower satisfaction with their health plans and little or no
choice among provider-sponsored health plans.24 The study reported that
nationwide in 1999 approximately half of individuals covered by employersponsored plans had no choice or limited choice of health plans.25 These
findings are generally consistent with other recent nationwide research.26 We
can reasonably infer from the polling noted above that patients trust their
doctors, but do not equally trust either big government or institutional health
care providers (that is, MCOs). In fact, hospitals, representing direct health
care services, rank very high in consumer satisfaction, while managed care
companies rank lowest. Limiting access to the physicians in whom patients
place their trust clearly creates a fertile environment for discontent.
Opportunity. The lack of choice, resentment over restrictions on health
care, and anecdotal horror stories give patients sufficient motive for homicide.
But patients have fewer opportunities than physicians to strike the deathblow.
Like physicians, patient dissatisfaction was an integral part of the managed
care backlash, especially taking their complaints to the media. Unlike
physicians, patients have only limited ability to influence legislation.
Groups such as the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”),
Families USA, California Health Decisions, numerous local and regional
health care consumer advocacy organizations, as well as state ombudsmen
services, all attempt to represent the patient perspective and interests in health
care delivery. Notwithstanding the work of each of these groups, patients
remain a highly fragmented group without an effective, collective voice or role
in influencing managed care policy. One observer writes:
When decisions are made about healthcare policy, procedures or processes, the
consumer’s point of view is somehow lost. Patient satisfaction surveys rarely
probe for answers that reveal the patient’s real beliefs. Employer coalitions
don’t often invite member/employee/consumers to participate. And they rarely
represent public sector populations such as Medicaid recipients. As valuable
as such efforts are, they are not enough to give us consumer-driven solutions to
the problems in managed care.27

24. Alain C. Enthoven et al., Consumer Choice and the Managed Care Backlash, 27 AM.
J.L. & MED. 1, 4, 6 (2001).
25. Id.
26. Wilensky, supra note 22, at 1018; Kenneth E. Thorpe, Managed Care as Victim or
Villain?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 949, 951 (1999).
27. Ellen B. Severoni, How to Keep Patients, Plans and Purchasers in the Loop, MANAGED
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 1, 1999, at 50, 50. Professor Marc Rodwin has written extensively about the
need for a more effective consumer voice in managed care policies. See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin,
Exit and Voice in American Health Care, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1041 (1999) [hereinafter
Rodwin, Exit and Voice in American Health Care]; Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and
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Perhaps the most effective patients’ response to their complaints about
managed care is to switch their health care coverage away from traditional
managed care plans to other alternatives, such as Preferred Provider
Organizations (“PPOs”) and Point-of-Service Plans (“POSs”).28 POS plans in
particular allow patients more flexibility in seeing specialists, hence eroding
MCO’s stringent cost controls. Employees have encouraged employers to
offer alternatives to managed care plans.
Employers
The impact of the employers’ role is not as readily apparent as patients or
physicians. In many ways employers determine the types of insurance
coverage available and the price employees will pay because most people
receive health insurance through their employer. The reality of modern health
care purchasing is that employees have only a limited voice in the benefits
available and employers might not purchase benefits individual employees
would select on their own.29
After World War II, health benefits became “a job entitlement . . . because
health coverage became a corporate practice to entice scarce workers under
wage controls during World War II and in the boom years that followed—and
is now given tax-free to employees.”30 This places employers in a somewhat
conflicted position. On the one hand, employers act as the employee’s agent in
selecting available insurance coverage options. On the other hand, employers
have their own economic interests at stake. Thus, employers may favor
options that are less desirable to employees.
Motive. If anything, employers have a strong interest in facilitating
managed care’s success. Since the premise of managed care is that it can
reduce costs while maintaining or even improving quality of care, employers
would not be well-served by its untimely demise. On the contrary, managed
care allows large employers to keep their health benefits’ costs manageable.
The promise was that if business practices and processes were applied to the

Managed Care: The Need for Organized Consumers, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 110.
28. Rodwin, Exit and Voice in American Health Care, supra note 27, at 1055.
29. Empirical evidence on the employee-employer agency relationship is mixed. Pamela B.
Peele et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Are Employers Good Agents for Their
Employees?, 78 MILBANK Q. 5, 16-17 (2000) (reported survey and focus group results showing
that employers may act as good agents for employees, in particular that employees would not be
better served by purchasing their health insurance directly). But see Mark W. Legnini et al.,
HEALTH AFF., May-June 2000, at 173, 175 (finding that this might not hold for small employers).
See also Dennis P. Scanlon et al., Consumer Health Plan Choice: Current Knowledge and Future
Directions, 18 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 507, 508, 524 (1997) (reporting limited employer
involvement in helping employees to interpret quality of care report cards).
30. Richard J. Mahoney, Missing in Action: The Health Care Consumer, DIRECTORSHIP,
Oct. 1999, at 1.
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delivery of health care, costs could be brought under control. Consequently,
managed care products rapidly proliferated as employers anticipated costcontrol relief. Unfortunately, the medical “march of science” and other factors
continued to drive costs up, eroding managed care’s ability to restrain cost
increases. Managed care premium rates increased 15.3% for 2002 and are
expected to increase another twenty-two percent (22%) for 2003, with little or
no room for employers of any size negotiating more favorable rate increases.31
The motive for undermining managed care occurs when employees express
their dissatisfaction with their MCO choices. In a delicate balancing act,
employers must weigh their cost concerns against employee complaints. This
was especially true during the booming economy of the mid-to-late 1990s.
During this period, employers competing for human resources knew that health
care benefits were crucial to attracting and retaining a quality workforce. A
“study of 528 U.S. employees found health care ranks as the most important
benefit, outscoring compensation by a margin of two to one.”32 So if you are
an employer in a globally competitive marketplace, how do you resolve the
runaway costs and employee expectations of quality, choice, and selfdetermination? Given these staggering financial assaults on profitability, could
it be that employers are the guilty parties and are responsible for the murder?
Opportunity. Despite their mixed motives, employers have had numerous
opportunities to sabotage managed care. The employers’ primary contribution
to managed care’s travails was their inability to demand that MCOs adhere to
stringent cost containment programs. Instead, employers succumbed to
employee dissatisfaction in two ways. First, employers failed to restrict the
number and types of benefit choices. Employers began offering PPOs and
POSs that, as noted above, operated to reduce the managed care industry’s
ability to restrain cost increases. In addition, employers did little to educate
their workers for the need for cost containment and why managed care was the
best vehicle for achieving a more stable health care environment. Second,
business health purchasing coalitions were unable to use their combined
leverage to ensure the promised cost constraints coupled with improved quality
of care.33
To reduce their costs, employers are now seeking alternatives to the
current system of providing health insurance benefits, primarily by opting for
plans that would shift costs back to the employee or patient. Some employers
are considering providing a fixed amount of money for health benefits (called
31. Press Release, Hewitt Associates, HMO Rates Continue to Rise at Double Digit Pace, at
http://was.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroom/pressrel/2002/06-04-02.htm (June 4, 2002).
32. Press Release, Hewitt Associates, Employees Rank Health Care as Number One Benefit
and Want More Control and Choice, at http://was.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroom/pressrel/
2002/02-25-02.htm (Feb. 25, 2002).
33. See, e.g., JACK A. MEYER ET AL., EMPLOYER COALITION INITIATIVES IN HEALTH CARE
PURCHASING (1996).
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defined contribution programs) and allowing employees to shop for their own
health care coverage.34 Defined contribution programs shift more of the health
care cost to employees than under the current defined benefits system, where
most of the cost is absorbed by employers. Defined contribution plans are a
method where “employers give employees more choice and control of their
health care, but set employer contributions at a fixed dollar amount and expect
employees to pay premium costs above that amount.”35 The changes to health
care delivery that lurk within the defined contribution strategy have the
potential to destroy managed care once and for all. Patients would choose their
own physicians, contracting for favorable negotiated rates. Capitation would
be nearly impossible at the individual level.
If successful, this would certainly influence the structure and operation of
MCOs because it would make managed care, already suspect to many
employees, even less attractive. As part of the strategy, employees’ copays for
doctor visits, emergency room services, prescription drugs, and specialist visits
have all increased. The goal is to shift costs away from the employer and to
sensitize employees to the cost of their health care consumption. It could have
that potential. But, according to insurance insiders, “[n]ewfangled consumerdriven health plans, which allow individuals to customize their own benefits
packages, have yet to catch fire.”36
A shift from seemingly unlimited paternalistic health care financing
management to consumers determining and designing their own health care
plan is loaded with challenges and obstacles. One obstacle is educating
employees in effectively analyzing plan benefits and options and making
decisions that fit their needs. This creates a huge support burden for
employers’ human resource staffs. Another more potentially damaging
obstacle is simply creating a new flavor of backlash. Employees may quickly
discern that they are assuming significantly more risk and cost along with
added choice. Employers could quickly find themselves more desperate for
solutions than they currently are.
To their credit, employers have renewed their collective interest in using
their leverage to impose quality of care improvements. Several new strategies
have emerged through organizations such as the Leapfrog Group. For
example, these groups are insisting that providers adhere to evidence-based
34. For a discussion of the defined contribution strategy, see Stephen Blakely, Defined
Contribution Health Benefits: The Next Evolution?, EBRI NOTES, Aug. 2001, at 1; John V.
Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability, and Disintermediation in
Managed Care, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305 (2001)
35. Julie A. Jacob, Consumer-Driven Health Plans Could Mean End of Capitation, AM.
MED. NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 15, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/
pick_01/bisa0813.htm.
36. Karen Pallarito, Health Care Inflation May Mean Workers Share Costs, REUTERS, at
http://www.clarian.org/content/reuters/037_06062002.jhtml (last updated June 6, 2002).
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medicine standards and increasingly expect that MCOs include disease
management plans in their products. Disease management entails a focus on
the common diseases responsible for the majority of health care costs.37
Managed care companies concentrate management of these conditions on a
case-by-case basis and implement a variety of monitoring mechanisms ranging
from telephone calls with nurses to electronic monitoring of critical indicators,
such as weight and blood pressure. One can hardly consider disease
management as a deathblow to managed care. Instead, it may arguably
reinforce the concepts inherent in managed care.
In the final analysis, employers have and continue to use their clout to pose
a threat to managed care, but we still have no more than circumstantial
evidence that they perpetrated the crime.
Courts
At the dawn of the modern managed care industry, many doubted whether
the courts would support managed care’s cost containment programs. After
all, neither the courts nor the legislative branch welcomed previous attempts to
impose institutional controls over physicians. The legal system relied on the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine to block institutional controls. One
study of previous efforts in the fee-for-service system to limit costs and
physician autonomy led to the ominous prediction that the cost containment
innovations in managed care would not survive judicial scrutiny.38 To many
observers, the courts were poised to disrupt the core premises of the new
Without doubt, these
managed care industry’s financial incentives.39
predictions were based on sound interpretation of judicial attitudes at that time.
What the scholars were unable to account for were changes in judicial
attitudes, fundamental ways in which managed care cases would depart from
fee-for-service litigation, and how the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”) would undercut all previous perceptions.
Motive. Thus, the judicial motive to attack managed care is not
diabolical.Rather, the court’s motive is to play its traditional oversight role in

37. The benefits executive at Calpers (California Public Employees’ Retirement System),
Allen Feezor, claims that sixty percent (60%) of health care costs are attributable to eighteen (18)
chronic diseases. Milt Freudenheim, A Changing World Is Forcing Changes on Managed Care,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at A1.
38. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988). For a more detailed analysis of the role
of the courts in shaping health care delivery and policy, see PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN
THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA (2000) [hereinafter JACOBSON,
STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT].
39. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Models of Rationing: Health Insurers’
Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992); John H. Ferguson et al.,
Court-Ordered Reimbursement for Unproven Medical Technology, 269 JAMA 2116 (1993).
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economic and social relations and in interpreting congressional statutes.
Although state courts tend to favor individual litigants, the historical
development of common law suggests that courts move slowly to impose
liability on a new industry such as managed care.40 In this case, liability
principles already applicable to hospitals might be applied to managed care
litigation.
One would also expect jurors to be sympathetic to patient challenges given
the managed care backlash, especially at the beginning of the litigation cycle.
If given the chance, I suspect that jurors would indeed punish MCOs for
denying care. But ERISA preemption has limited the ability to take cases to
state court juries, leaving open the question of how jurors would respond if
ERISA preemption were eliminated.
Opportunity.41 Regardless of potential motives, courts, especially federal,
have had considerable opportunity to derail managed care. All it would take is
for courts to rule that managed care’s cost containment programs and financial
incentives can be challenged in state courts. The cases decided so far suggest
that courts are not systematically impeding the implementation of cost
containment initiatives. Instead, courts have relied on ERISA preemption to
limit patients’ state tort litigation against MCOs. This limits the ability of state
courts, which might otherwise be receptive to patients’ lawsuits, to impose
significant damages or restrictions on managed care operations. The
conventional wisdom that the courts would undermine cost containment
initiatives has not happened. Whatever problems the managed care industry
faces, the industry’s fears about judicial intervention have largely been
avoided. Legal challenges to the managed care industry have proven more
difficult to win than expected.
Even though judges have struggled with some aspects of managed care, the
judicial decisions present a clear, overriding theme: courts are facilitating the
market-based arrangements that drive managed care. In most aspects of health
care litigation, courts treat the health care field as they would any other
industry. This amounts to deference to prevailing market principles in health
care delivery, as courts have shown no inclination to reflexively overturn
market decisions. The clearest evidence is in courts’ increasing deference to
contractual arrangements, in physicians’ litigation against MCOs, and in
antitrust cases where courts are not protecting MCOs from competitive forces
in the health care market.

40. Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Establishing New Legal Doctrine in Managed
Care: A Model of Judicial Response to Industrial Change, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 813
(1999).
41. This section is borrowed liberally from JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT, supra
note 38. See also Peter D. Jacobson, Legal Challenges to Managed Care Cost Containment
Programs: An Initial Assessment, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 69.
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A second theme evident from the litigation is the slow development of
MCO liability. Neither physicians nor patients have been successful in directly
contesting managed care practices. Patients and physicians have brought a
wide range of challenges to managed care’s cost containment programs, most
of which have been unsuccessful. For instance, patients have sued MCOs
alleging negligence for injuries resulting from delayed or denied care or from
the improper operation of financial incentives to limit care. Primarily because
of ERISA, these challenges have often been futile. Even outside of ERISA,
plaintiffs have not won a majority of cases.42
Physicians have not fared much better in challenging MCO practices.
Except for some inroads on fair procedures, courts have been unsympathetic to
physician arguments. Physicians have been primarily put at a disadvantage in
liability challenges to MCO practices. Largely because of ERISA, patient
challenges in state courts to delayed or denied care have often been preempted,
leaving the treating physician exposed to liability without being able to “share”
responsibility with the MCO. Also, courts have upheld the use of utilization
review for controlling costs, especially under ERISA, regardless of the treating
physician’s recommendation.
Finally, courts are sending the message that restrictions on managed care
innovations should be made by the legislatures, not by the courts. In the
ERISA cases, for example, judges have complained, at times vociferously, that
ERISA preemption results in unjust outcomes preventing courts from holding
MCOs accountable for their actions.43 Even so, judges have largely deferred to
Congress to change ERISA preemption rather than judicially reinterpreting
ERISA to achieve more equitable results. As a general proposition, judges
have determined that complaints about the organization and delivery of
managed care should be resolved by elected officials.44
Legislatures
Since the courts punted to the elected officials, how have they responded?
Not surprisingly, much of the backlash to managed care led to calls for tighter
legislative and regulatory oversight. At the federal level, the primary
legislative debate has been over the proposed patients’ bill of rights. In brief,
such legislation would amend ERISA and permit patients to sue their MCO
and states to regulate managed care. Currently, ERISA doctrine acts to
42. For a more detailed empirical analysis of these trends, see Peter D. Jacobson et al., The
Role of the Courts in Shaping Health Policy: An Empirical Analysis, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 278
(2001).
43. See, e.g., Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
44. For a clear statement of that principle (and for the institutional reasons why courts should
be reluctant to intervene), see Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221-22 (2000). In other words,
courts have protected the market winner—MCOs. In the fee-for-service era, courts also protected
the market winner—but then it was the physicians.
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preempt the application of state laws and state tort litigation to ERISA-covered
employee benefit plans (“EBPs”). Courts have uniformly held that MCOs are
part of an EBP, and can, therefore, assert ERISA preemption.45 Despite
repeated news reports of congressional compromise, the patients’ bill of rights
has not been enacted as of this writing.
At the state level, there has been much more legislation enacted. However,
because of ERISA preemption, it is difficult for states to predict which
legislation will survive judicial scrutiny.46 In view of the continuing
congressional stalemate, the likely venue for debates about regulating managed
care will be in state legislatures.
Motive. Both patients and physicians are demanding greater accountability
through legislative and regulatory oversight. Since health care has traditionally
been regulated at the state level, it makes sense that state legislatures will be
active participants in determining managed care’s fate. For re-election
purposes, state legislators have an incentive to protect patients. At the same
time, legislators are highly influenced by the managed care industry’s lobbying
clout.
As a result, legislators’ motives for attacking managed care are quite
mixed. Thus, while neither Congress nor state legislators can ignore the
backlash, the industry’s ability to block legislation (currently stronger in
Congress than in state legislatures) suggests a continuing stalemate. One way
of responding would be for legislators to act by imposing benefit coverage
mandates. For example, thirteen state legislatures mandated that health
insurers cover autologous bone marrow transplants with high dose
chemotherapy (ABMT/HDC), despite disputed evidence of the procedure’s
efficacy. While not a direct attack on managed care, mandated benefits
certainly limit the managed care industry’s ability to control costs by limiting
benefit coverage.
Opportunity. There is little question that legislators, especially in
Congress, have the opportunity to alter how managed care operates. By
amending ERISA, Congress could open MCOs to patient litigation for delayed
or denied care and expand the reach of state legislative efforts. For many
reasons, the congressional patients’ rights debate has become more symbolic
than of real consequence. Although Congress has chosen not to amend
ERISA, it has taken action on certain issues (often called legislation by body
part). For instance, Congress prohibited so-called drive-through deliveries by

45. For a more detailed explanation of ERISA preemption, see Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D.
Pomfret, ERISA Litigation and Physician Autonomy, 283 JAMA 921 (2000).
46. Compare, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2002) (upholding
a state law imposing an independent patient grievance process), with Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (barring punitive damages recovery).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

WHO KILLED MANAGED CARE?

383

mandating that women could not be discharged before forty-eight hours
following delivery.47
The picture is certainly different at the state level where MCOs face
increasing scrutiny. In many ways, the managed care backlash has been most
evident in state-level attempts to control MCOs. States have attempted to
impose external grievance processes, which would allow patients to sue for
delayed or denied care, or to require the disclosure of financial incentives.
Early laws governing MCOs focused on the right of physicians to participate in
MCO networks (so-called “any willing provider” laws), and on the right of
physicians to discuss any aspect of care with their patients that related directly
to managed care’s financial incentives (so-called “anti-gag” rules). More
recently, some states have imposed requirements mandating direct access to
specialists. Many states limited managed care’s financial incentives by
prohibiting incentives that would lead to the denial of medically necessary
care.48 Some of these laws have gone into effect, but others have been
preempted by ERISA.
Take, for example, any willing provider (“AWP”) laws as a proxy for a
range of state legislative attempts to regulate MCOs. AWP laws would require
MCOs to contract with any physician willing to meet the MCO’s established
criteria. These laws are intended to preserve patient choice of physician.
MCOs oppose these laws because they eliminate at least one cost reduction
mechanism—a managed care plan’s ability to choose physicians who will be
willing to offer lower prices in return for guaranteed patient volume. AWP
laws affect another cost reduction mechanism, the power to control quality of
care by restricting membership in the plan’s network to those physicians
meeting rigorous quality standards. Without the ability to select participating
physicians based on cost and quality standards, MCOs argue that they cannot
as easily monitor the quality of care. Almost two dozen states have enacted
such laws, but the courts are split as to whether ERISA preempts them.49 The
Supreme Court agreed to resolve the split in the lower courts.50
In sum, mixed motives resulted in limited exercise of the legislative
opportunities to hold managed care accountable.

47. This type of legislative intervention has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., David A.
Hyman, Drive-through Deliveries: Is “Consumer Protection” Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78
N.C. L. REV. 5 (1999).
48. Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulation, 278 JAMA 1102 (1997).
49. See, Tanya Albert, High Court Weighs Any-Willing-Provider Laws, AM. MED. NEWS,
July 29, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_02/
gvl20729.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002).
50. Id. at 2.
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The Media
Any scrupulous murder investigation will turn its attention to a suspect that
is known to have scrutinized, exposed, berated, vilified, and generally
tormented the victim. Newspapers, magazines, network and cable news
reports, television programs, and even movies have led the charge to discredit
managed care. Could this outspoken critic be the guilty party?
Motive. It may be an overstatement to suggest that entertainment and
broadcast media, particularly television and the movies, thrive on
salaciousness, controversy, and creating a villain—but not by much.51 Not too
long ago, one local television news broadcast attempted to downplay local
crime and to focus on in-depth reports of local interest. Ratings tanked, and
the experiment ended quickly. One reason is that crime and similar stories
grab our attention, while softer features or serious investigative pieces tend to
drift by largely unnoticed.52 Instead, media circuses such as the O.J. Simpson
trial capture the public’s interest much more readily than most events. Since
the media do not publish or broadcast information for their own use or
gratification, without the ability to hold readers and viewers, the media would
cease to exist. The motive? Simple—ratings.
In this kind of dog-eat-dog scenario, managed care provided everything the
media needed to galvanize the public’s outrage. Corporate profiteers, a
plethora of tear-jerking human interest pieces, double-minded and doublecrossing politicians, a labyrinth of indecipherable regulations and legislation
and physicians reduced to assembly-line medical bureaucrats all contributed
mightily to wave upon wave of assaults on an embattled industry.53 Horror
story after horror story decried managed care’s heartlessness, callousness,
indifference and venality. What the media forgot, or chose not to report, were
managed care’s successes, along with why it replaced the fee-for-service
system. There has been little balance in media coverage of the industry.
True, the managed care industry has served up plenty of material for a
media group spurred on by the scent of blood. So much so that the American
Association of Health Plans (“AAHP”) recently retained a public relations firm
to use its clout and influence for AAHP to obtain audiences with the power
brokers of pop-culture.54 The public relations objective is to “offer itself as a
resource on medical topics that may be interesting” and presumably influence
the storyline in movies such as John Q and As Good as it Gets.55 The fact that

51. See Local TV News and Violence, MEDIASCOPE, at http://www.mediascope.org/
pubs.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2002).
52. See id.
53. Barbara Martinez, Tired of Being Cast as the Villain, HMOs Hire Talent Agency, WALL
ST. J., July 9, 2002, at B1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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the managed care industry as a whole spends its resources on a Hollywood
talent agency for public relations spin instead of substantive quality and
process improvement certainly confirms that it, at least, believes the media has
a motive for murder. Indeed, the industry may have waited too long to unleash
a media counter-attack.
Opportunity. The media helped set the policy agenda. As a vast enterprise
with the ability to keep a story alive for as long as it wants, the media can
create a groundswell of interest that can be disproportionate to the seriousness
of the event. Witness the frenzy over the O.J. Simpson trial. On the other
hand, media attention to a particular problem can be beneficial in forcing
politicians to respond to social problems or in holding public officials and
corporate executives accountable. A good example is the recent focus on
corporate greed and the resulting legislation. In short, the media has an
extraordinary opportunity through its vast reach, repetition via multiple media,
and attention-getting headlines to slay managed care or to adulate it.
However, that same focus can be destructive, as with the emphasis on
managed care’s failures while ignoring its successes. Even assuming that the
horror stories are true, the question is one of balance and perspective. Out of
the millions of patient encounters, it is not surprising that a few result in bad
outcomes or that the industry acts in bad faith. Yet how representative are the
horror stories and how much media play do they deserve? To what extent are
the horror stories evidence of systematic failures or merely aberrations that
deserve, at best, only brief media attention? How should those instances be
weighed against the many encounters that result in appropriate outcomes with
overall reduced costs?
Of equal concern to industry and patients alike, the media message may be
fragmented, with sectors portraying the same facts differently, and not always
correctly. An example is the media response to a report on research on the
length of physicians’ visits under managed care versus traditional financing
methods. The original published report surprisingly revealed empirical
evidence that “[t]he average time physicians spend with patients increased
during a period in which managed care penetration grew.”56 This finding
contradicted commonly held beliefs by physicians and the public about
managed care physicians spending far too little time with their patients.
Distressingly, the media coverage was woefully inadequate and sometimes
inaccurate, even though the authors conclude that the overall media coverage
was credible.

56. David Mechanic & Donna D. McAlpine, “Fifteen Minutes of Fame”: Reflections on the
Uses of Health Research, the Media, Pundits, and the Spin, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at
211. The original findings were reported in David Mechanic et al., Are Patients’ Office Visits
with Physicians Getting Shorter?, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198 (2001).
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Some reporters who wrote stories for local newspapers got the facts wrong.
Stories adapted from these reports further disseminated these errors. . . . In the
case of one medical publication, we twice reviewed its coverage for accuracy
and provided factual corrections. The final copy included this medical editor’s
note:
“It should be emphasized that managed care has resulted in an increase in
the administrative aspects of patient care, and the time required to do these
administrative tasks may contribute to less time actually spent with the
patient but more time spent on the patient’s records.”
We informed the publication that this statement was inconsistent with the
AMA data reported in the paper; the writer responded that “I know what you
are saying is that the data does not uphold his comment, but I am going to
leave it in there as an editor’s note, because it is in his experience.”57

Although the industry has been on the defensive because of the selective
reporting of managed care, the industry is fully capable of using the media to
manipulate public opinion. One way is to place advertisements that shape the
policy environment. For example, the famous “Harry and Louise” campaign
played a large role in defeating the Clinton Administration’s proposed Health
Security Act (“HSA”) in 1994. In this public relations effort, the Health
Insurance Association of America (“HIAA”) produced an advertising
campaign to derail the HSA. The ad showed a couple pouring over the details
of the HSA and becoming increasingly concerned that the government would
dictate their health care choices. The ad simultaneously elevated the ability of
the market to provide the most effective health care system and demonized
governmental efforts to regulate the market. As a media event, it succeeded
brilliantly.58 Many news reports covered the ad, repeatedly and widely
showing it and discussing its content. At a minimum, it contributed
significantly to the HSA’s demise.59 At the same time, it had the unintended

57. Mechanic & McAlpine, supra note 55, at 213. See also Theodore R. Marmor, A Summer
of Discontent: Press Coverage of Murder and Medical Care Reform, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y &
L. 495, 501 (1995) (noting that “[t]he nation’s political reporters know relatively little about
health care issues” and permitted the creation of media stars opposed to health care reform to
offer their views without adequate scrutiny).
58. For an empirical argument that the ad campaign reversed public opinion away from
trends unfavorable to the insurance industry, see Raymond L. Goldsteen et al., Harry and Louise
and Health Care Reform: Romancing Public Opinion, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1325
(2001). For a skeptical view of the empirical evidence, see Mollyann Brodie, Impact of Issue
Advertisements and the Legacy of Harry and Louise, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1353 (2001).
Brodie, nevertheless, agrees about the general impact of the ad campaign, at least in changing
how the debate was framed.
59. This successful strategy is likely to be emulated in future health policy battles, such as
debates over patients’ rights and pharmaceutical benefits. See, e.g., Jennifer Schecter, The Return
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consequence of overselling the market’s ability to provide high quality health
care at low cost. In turn, the overselling contributed to managed care’s travails
when it was unable to perform as anticipated.
Another way is to hire public relations firms to burnish the industry’s
image. According to published reports, the industry’s public relations effort
will focus on two complementary strategies.60 The first will be to build
bridges with movie and television scriptwriters to influence how the scripts
portray managed care industry. The second will be to blame others, especially
attorneys, for managed care’s perceived deficiencies.61
One further caveat remains regarding the media. By the time the various
interest groups, from industry representatives to pop culture panderers, get
through with their treatment of the subject, the public may only be left with
more confusion and a general sense of distrust and discontent. As a result, the
opportunity to kill managed care may not be as clear-cut as initially suspected.
Health Insurers
What a perfect suspect health insurance companies make. They were the
suppliers of what had become a commonplace employment benefit—health
insurance—and had seemingly limitless resources to topple a competing
industry. Also, managed care indisputably surpassed health insurance as a
health care financing plan. Yet, in this murder mystery, can we take anything
simplistic at face value? More importantly, there are many overlapping
interests that the competitors share, so that protecting one would inevitably
help the other. For instance, both have an interest in avoiding state benefit
mandates.
Health insurance benefits had become a method for employers to attract
employees during wage controls after World War II. By the 1980s, they were
a familiar employee benefit, and insurance companies profitably marketed
indemnity products far and wide. Many factors, not the least of which was
technological advances in medicine, brought about year after year of increased
premium costs and, with them, pressure from all sides to stop the rapid rate of
increases. The ideas of nationalizing and reforming the U.S. health care
delivery and financing system, including the ill-fated Clinton plan, were
soundly trounced on several occasions, in no small part due to insurance
industry efforts. This left the private sector free to organize and deliver health
care.

of Harry and Louise, MULTINAT’L MONITOR, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 35, available at
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm1998/mm9801.11.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2002).
60. CNN.com/Health, Health Care Group Hires Hollywood Agent to Improve Its Image, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/07/13/hmo.pr.ap (last visited July 13, 2002).
61. Id. “Instead of attacking the film, the AAHP bought ads deflecting the focus of anger
from insurance plans to ‘a runaway litigation system and expensive government regulations.’” Id.
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However, by this time, commercial (indemnity) health insurers were in
decline, largely supplanted by MCOs. For a variety of reasons, large
employers have shifted their coverage toward managed care. That leaves
commercial insurers with a much riskier and less lucrative market for small
employers and individual policyholders.
Insurance companies often transformed their product lines into managed
care products and themselves into managed care companies. Frequently,
managed care companies were born out of the decline of traditional insurance
companies. In many instances, they became for-profit MCOs, particularly in
California.62 Thus, the managed care landscape became populated with
insurance companies in a new role. Just as we asked doctors to act like
insurance companies in accepting risk through capitation, we have asked
insurance companies to act like doctors in combining the insurance and clinical
aspects in one corporate entity. Neither plan has worked very well. However,
it does deflate the evidence that insurers perpetrated the murder, since, as it
turns out, many have come to reap the monetary benefits of managed care.
Hospitals
During managed care’s ascendancy, it seems fair to suggest that hospitals
got run over. As managed care entities grew in size and scope, hospitals had
little negotiating leverage in rates they could charge. Hospitals were
dependent on managed care for patient referrals, thereby limiting hospital
administrators’ abilities to negotiate over fees.
Although MCOs still hold the balance of power, times have changed.
Since the late 1990s, hospitals have gained negotiating leverage and are able to
demand higher reimbursement rates. Under pressure to close unneeded beds
and to streamline operations, the number of hospitals has declined by nine
percent (9%) since 1990, even as the population has increased.63 Some
facilities have closed, but others have consolidated into larger chains,
equivalent in size and power to MCOs. Not surprisingly, the hospital chains,
which control large numbers of beds in many markets, are demanding and
receiving a higher price for their services.64
It seems unlikely that hospitals set out to kill managed care. After all,
hospitals are still dependent on MCOs for patients. Yet it seems highly likely
62. Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Managed Competition and California’s Health
Care Economy, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1996, at 39. See also Robinson, supra note 5, at 2623.
63. Joseph Weber & John Cady, The New Power Play in Health Care, BUS. WK., Jan. 28,
2002, at 90; Barbara Martinez, With New Muscle, Hospitals Squeeze Insurers on Rates, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 12, 2002, at A1. Both articles document instances where hospitals forced MCOs to pay
higher rates in showdowns.
64. Martinez, supra note 63, at A1. According to Martinez, two hospitals in Cleveland,
Ohio control sixty-eight percent (68%) of the beds, while one hospital system in Grand Rapids,
Michigan controls seventy percent (70%). Id.
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that hospitals “piled on” once the decline set in. After years of rates that
squeezed hospital revenues and services, hospital administrators responded in
ways that were designed to provide greater negotiating power. That their
subsequent success further damaged MCOs’ ability to control costs offers little
evidence of murder.65 It may reflect opportunism, but that is the American
way.
The Managed Care Industry
One by one, the investigation has carefully scrutinized each of the possible
murderers, eventually raising questions about motive or opportunity for each
and every one. Where, then, to turn? At first glance, it seems rather silly to
implicate the managed care industry itself. What motive for self-destruction
could it possibly harbor, given what one managed care executive calls the
“[unfulfilled] promise of managed care”?66 To be sure, the industry
overpromised what it could achieve, but there is nothing unusual or untoward
about creating high, and even unrealistic, expectations.
Managed Care as a Concept. In fact, managed care as a concept is a good
idea. Conceptually, combining the financing and clinical functions into one
entity as a mechanism for saving costs and improving quality makes sense.
Managed care’s cost containment programs were offered as a needed
corrective to the excesses of the fee-for-service system. In the ideal construct,
balancing access to care with cost controls is imperative in view of the reality
of scarce resources. Indeed, any system that replaces managed care will still
need to confront the reality of scarce resources. In addition, managed care’s
desired focus on evidence-based medicine to guide clinical decisions offered a
sound basis for determining whether care should be provided to an individual
patient. Furthermore, the industry’s stated emphasis on prevention and
improving quality of care were welcome innovations in health care delivery.
Initially, managed care delivered many of its promises. For many years, its
cost containment programs reduced the rate of increase in health care costs.
As noted earlier, many scholars have concluded that managed care quality is
roughly equivalent to fee-for-service medicine. And the industry has steadily
improved on providing preventive care to its members and, in many instances,
to the community at-large. Over time, however, managed care was unable to
restrain cost increases, as double-digit health insurance premium increases
65. At the Symposium, Professor Nicolas Terry observed that pharmaceutical manufacturers
also pursued strategies that helped undermine managed care’s ability to control costs. For
example, the direct-to-consumer marketing effort has clearly raised the cost of providing
prescription drugs by helping to eviscerate tolerance of pharmaceutical formularies designed to
restrict which drugs can be prescribed. See, e.g., Vanessa O’Connell, FDA Survey Says Doctors
Often Prescribe the Brands Consumers Name from Ads, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at B4.
66. Glenn Howatt, Brainerd Takes the Helm at HealthPartners, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
May 5, 2002, at 1D.
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have returned. The horror stories undermined the industry’s claims of
combining quality improvements and access to care.
Implementation. What went wrong? Although there is no scholarly
agreement as to why managed care failed to meet its promise, several reasons
seem plausible. To begin with, the concept was not implemented very well.
Patients and physicians were needlessly antagonized. Published reports of
high salaries for executives amid demands for cost controls did nothing to
enhance the concept’s credibility. Repeatedly, the industry allowed the
perception to fester that it was more interested in managing costs than in
providing care—a perception of profits over care that fueled patient suspicions
of rampant conflicts of interest. The industry failed to educate patients about
the concept of managed care and the need to control costs, and it failed to
include patients in determining how cost containment would operate. For
instance, patients were rarely told about why a treatment recommendation was
denied and were rarely granted a grievance process to review the denial. A
supporter of the concept captured the scope of this failure, as follows:
HMOs are not helpless victims of the managed care backlash. Rather, at times
they seem to be their own worst enemies. . . . Some health plans have
needlessly antagonized physicians in their cost control efforts rather than try to
find ways to win their cooperation in an effort to improve quality while
reducing costs. Many have done a poor job of recognizing and responding to
reasonable and legitimate consumer and patient concerns. Although this
behavior is not true of all health plans and not always true of any of them, such
resistance, lack of responsiveness, and antagonistic behavior reflect negatively
on the industry.67

Equally important, the industry failed to accept accountability for its role
in clinical decisions.68 At this point, the managed care industry has not
demonstrated a willingness to hold itself accountable for its products and, there
is no legal or political constraint on its activities. The case of Maio v. Aetna69
is indicative and instructive of the lack of accountability. Aetna elected to
defend a legal challenge to its managed care operations by asserting that public
statements touting its primary commitment to quality of health care were
“mere puffery.”70 Translated from the technical language of the law, the
essence of Aetna’s defense was that reasonable consumers would understand
that its avowed commitment to quality was a statement of opinion not intended

67. Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Unrealistic Expectations Born of Defective
Institutions, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 931, 935-36 (1999).
68. This analysis is borrowed from a more extensive examination in JACOBSON STRANGERS
IN THE NIGHT, supra note 38.
69. 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2000).
70. Id. at 479.
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to be relied upon or to convey anything factual about its managed care plans.71
Regardless of the merits of Aetna’s legal argument, a voluntary
characterization of public and repeated commitments to quality medical care as
“mere puffery” seems an unusual way to represent one of managed care’s core
functions. It is ironic that when quality of care is perhaps the central issue
concerning public attitudes toward managed care, one of the industry’s major
players simply discounts its own stated commitment to high quality care. Maio
exposes the absence of voluntary accountability.
Reacting to Maio, a prominent health law scholar argued that
such advertising provides a weak basis for a consumer class action. If such
advertising works at all, it is most likely to attract healthy rather than unhealthy
subscribers . . . . It is simply too much to expect competing health plans to pay
special attention to quality when it is clearly against their commercial interests
to do so.72

As far as it goes, that may be accurate. Yet the dismissiveness of the false
advertising claims betrays the effects of the false advertising on an individual
patient. The managed care industry is also likely to argue that Maio is a trivial
example and not indicative of the industry’s overall commitment to quality
health care. Perhaps so. Yet Aetna’s stance in that case was certainly
consistent with a philosophy that puts patients a distant second to other
considerations.73 Moreover, this is not the only time when the industry’s
public posture was at odds with its private actions. The incongruity between
public statements and private decisions further exposes the accountability gap.
Equally important, Maio is symptomatic of a larger failure to provide
adequate information to the public. Maintaining a market-based health care
system requires that patients have adequate access to information that allows
them to make an informed decision about the type and amount of health care to
purchase. A fundamental flaw in the market approach in health care is the
patient’s inability to judge the quality of health care. Deliberately depicting a
commitment to quality of care in terms that an MCO has no intention of
upholding may be nothing more than puffery in the law and may not amount to
false and deceptive advertising. Nevertheless, it certainly undermines the
rationale for a self-regulated market-driven system that proponents have
offered. The managed care industry conveys to the public and to political
71. Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other “Loophole” Claims: How the Law’s “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49 (1998).
72. Clark C. Havighurst, Consumers Versus Managed Care: The New Class Actions,
HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2001, at 8, 15-16.
73. In response to patients’ claims for access to payer databases to substantiate promises of
quality of care and to determine whether physician reimbursements were adequate, Aetna’s
attorney was quoted as saying that granting access would be “abusive, oppressive, and
overreaching.” Catherine Wilson, Lawsuits Pending on Managed Care, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, July 17, 2002, at E10.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

392

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:365

officials that it shares professional values in ways that differ from those of
other sellers in several key dimensions. In contrast, the defense of mere
puffery about commitment to quality strikes at the heart of the managed care
enterprise and the social contract between the managed care industry and the
public.
Managed Care as an Industry. These implementation failures have been
compounded by an industry-wide strategy, reflected in the major trade
association’s policies, that is largely about image management. The American
Association of Health Plans (“AAHP”) was created in 1995 from a merger of
two managed care/insurance organizations and quickly became the voice of
this burgeoning industry. Its stated mission is “to advance health care quality
and affordability through leadership in the health care community, advocacy
and the provision of services to member health plans,”74 but it focuses much of
its activities on lobbying and public relations management as opposed to
“advancing quality.”
As managed care took off, it was concurrently praised for putting a lid on
runaway expenditures and vilified for restricting care and physician payments.
The AAHP’s response to much of the criticism and proposed patients’ rights
legislation has been like that of a recalcitrant child—just say no.75 Take, for
example, AAHP’s response to a survey finding that one in seven could not get
needed healthcare services, regardless of their insurance status.76 AAHP
ascribed the decline in access that occurred during this period of managed care
market penetration to “some providers . . . contracting with fewer insurers, and
others [being] too overwhelmed to take new patients. Changes in employersponsored plans also mean that a favorite doctor or hospital could be dropped
from the patient’s network.”77 AAHP seems to suggest that the inability to get
medical care when needed has nothing to do with managed care restrictions.
Instead, it is caused by physicians who refuse large numbers of patients and
patients who are not sick enough to justify being overly selective about the
doctor they see.
After successfully contributing to the defeat of the Clinton plan for
healthcare reform, the industry, the HIAA,78 and AAHP have doggedly fought

74. American Association of Health Plans, Who We Are, at http://www.aahp.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/About_AAHP/Who_We_Are/WhoWeAre.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2002).
75. This is also a reference to Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign against teen drug
use.
76. Bradley C. Strunk & Peter J. Cunningham, Treading Water: Americans’ Access to
Needed Medical Care, 1997-2001, at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/421 (Mar. 2002).
77. Alicia Ault, One in Seven in U.S. Can’t Get Healthcare as Needed, Reuters Health, at
http://www.handi-stop.com/bbs/messages/1246.html (Mar. 21, 2002).
78. Jeanne Schulte Scott, ClintonCare II: The Revenge, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGM’T, Jan.
1998, at 24.
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any attempt to take an incremental approach to reforming the system, without
offering any alternative to the status quo. As early as 1996, AAHP attempted
to obfuscate the public cry to give patients an appeals process and to provide
an escape route from pre-authorizations and non-covered emergency services.
The organization sought to preempt legislation by launching a “Putting
Patients First Initiative” that included voluntary member guidelines and no
enforcement provisions whatsoever for their one thousand member MCOs.79
Critics characterized the initiative as a way to avoid more stringent legislative
and political oversight.80 As one critic noted, “It is based on the faulty premise
that there are not really any problems with managed care—only confusion
resulting from anti-managed care misinformation—and asserts that the answer
lies merely in health plans holding themselves accountable.”81
At the same time, AAHP vigorously opposed “prudent layperson”
legislation that would codify a patient’s right to obtain treatment outside the
plan in emergency situations. Despite the commitment to voluntary grievance
procedures, AAHP has opposed state legislation mandating them and has
supported legal challenges to such laws even when the voluntary approach
showed few results.82 The managed care industry has consistently opposed
similar federal legislation even though AAHP’s studies have concluded that
independent reviews are relatively infrequent and about half of the cases
reviewed by independent reviewers confirm the insurers’ medical decisions.83
Faced with the possibility of Congress granting physicians the right to
bargain collectively with MCOs, AAHP decried the initiative. Somewhat
disingenuously, AAHP does not claim that this right would be problematic for
MCOs negotiating with large powerful physician groups. The stated concern
is only for the “working families” and the increased cost and reduced quality
that would result from collective bargaining by physicians.84

79. AAHP Sees the Handwriting on the Wall, BUS. & HEALTH, Mar. 1997, at 13.
80. The Managed-Care Industry Fights Back, MED. ECON., June 23, 1997, at 119.
81. Peter V. Lee, The True Test of Whether Health Plans Put Patients First, HEALTH AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 129.
82. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
83. See Michael Milt Pretzer, The Case for Less Regulation of Managed Care, MED. ECON.,
June 15, 1998, at 48, 56; M. Freudenheim, Big HMO to Give Decisions on Care Back to Doctors,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1999, at A16; American Association of Health Plans, Independent Medical
Review of Health Plan Coverage Decisions: A Framework for Excellence, available at
http://www.aahp.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About_AAHP/News_Room/Press_Releases/Press
_Release_Archive?IndepenMedReviewBook.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
84. Press Release, AAHP, Barr-Conyers’ Legislation Advances Provider Interests at
Expense of Consumers (Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://www.aahp.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/About_AAHP/News_Room/Press_Releases/AAHP__Barr-ConyersandNum
8217;_Legislation_Advances_Provider_Interests_At_Expense_of_Consumers_(3_07_.htm.
Denying that United Healthcare’s move to discontinue preauthorization requirements was in
response to the threat of patients’ rights legislation, AAHP’s Susan Pisano attributed it to “the
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I am hard pressed to find a meaningful, constructive dialogue taking place
that includes managed care industry organizations. While the managed care
industry fights legislation, regulations, and public opinion that call for
managed care reform and accountability, the industry is very open to
legislation that benefits their members. Amidst AAHP roadblocks to patients’
rights, the organization’s calls for limits on litigation and added Medicare
prescription drug benefits can be heard. All of these examples demonstrate the
industry’s oppositional, protectionist approach.
THE VERDICT
Each of the actors had either motive or opportunity to kill managed care.
Yet each also had what amounts to an alibi. Either the motive was mixed or
the opportunity to act was limited. At first glance, the most obvious
conclusion would be that each actor contributed to what might be considered
death by a thousand cuts. There is much to support this outcome, since it
seems undeniable that actions taken by each of the suspects contributed in
some way to managed care’s travails. This conclusion is also convenient for
each of the players because they can avoid blame. Each can legitimately say
“I didn’t do it—you can’t attribute managed care’s death to me. ‘X’s’
contribution was much more significant than mine. Sure, I played a role, but I
was just protecting my own interests. I had no desire to sabotage managed
care.” In this sense, each actor played a necessary, but not alone sufficient,
role in killing managed care.
Yet that verdict seems wrong to me because one of the participants above
all is complicit. I conclude that the primary perpetrator was the managed care
industry itself, a result of failures from within. Through self-inflicted wounds,
the industry self-destructed. To be sure, implacable opposition and political
interference from outside beset the industry and made survival a difficult
challenge. In this context, the fate of managed care has many similarities to
The Perfect Storm.85 This popular book and subsequent film depicted the story
of three different and distinct weather patterns that converged to create a storm
of power and destruction that was far greater than the aggregate of the
individual storms. By analogy to that story, the howling wind from the north
was simultaneous pressure from employers/purchasers who wanted relief from
soaring costs and from employees/patients who wanted options and choices.
The gale from the south was patient dissatisfaction that manifested itself in the
form of thunderous opposition. Finally, the hurricane from the east was

next stage in the evolution of health care, the edge of a wave of change.” Freudenheim, supra
note 82 at A1.
85. SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM: A TRUE STORY OF MEN AGAINST THE SEA
(1997). I am indebted to my research assistant, Deanna Hanks, for suggesting and developing the
analogy.
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physician dissatisfaction that set off hardball negotiating strategies with deep
antagonism toward MCOs. With high hopes the ship Andrea Gail sailed into
the vortex of the 1991 convergence of three storms, just as the advent of
managed care converged with high public policy hopes and expectations of
providing high-quality health care while controlling costs.
The captain and crew of the Andrea Gail did not intend or anticipate being
killed any more than managed care intended to be a victim. The visionaries
and innovators of managed care saw an organizational form that would rely on
the power of the marketplace to integrate the financing and delivery functions
of health services. Unfortunately, the implementation failed to achieve these
goals without alienating too many stakeholders. Perhaps the expectations were
too great, and the window for success too narrow, but the poor implementation
of managed care unwittingly created the opportunity to fall victim to itself.
Certainly, the other suspects contributed to the mauling, making it difficult
for the industry to overcome its mistakes. At a minimum, these suspects
hastened managed care’s demise. Physicians and patients clearly aided and
abetted the demise. There is little question that neither group will be mourning
at the funeral. Politicians contributed by constantly threatening to intervene
and focusing unwanted attention on the industry’s shortcomings, though the
courts were, surprisingly, largely bystanders. Hospitals continued the pressure
by ratcheting up their fees, and employers succumbed to employee demands
for greater choice in health care coverage. Indeed, employers squandered the
opportunity to hold MCOs and employees to the cost-access tradeoff.
Moreover, the media played a central role as handmaidens to the slaughter by
overplaying the horror stories and not reporting on managed care’s successes.
Managed care could, nevertheless, have overcome the combined
contributions of its detractors. It offered a good concept at the right time. The
country was looking for ways to reduce health care costs without sacrificing
quality of care, and managed care offered the conceptual model to accomplish
those objectives. Yet, the design was poorly implemented, with little regard
for legitimate patient and physician complaints. The industry’s “just say no”
response to criticism is eerily reminiscent of how the tobacco industry
responded to mounting scientific evidence of the harms its products caused. In
both cases, the industry failed to adapt to public discontent, resulting in
vilification and a public backlash. To that extent, managed care’s death did not
occur as a result of natural causes.
The Implications
Future health care historians may well look back and see managed care as
a transition between the fee-for-service system and an entirely new way of
delivering and financing health care. Whatever managed care’s current
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problems, it seems premature to declare that it is dead. It is certainly in retreat
and may well be on life-supports, but it is not dead yet.86 In either case,
policymakers will need to address several questions: Is it worth resuscitating?
If so, what will it take to revive it? If not, what will replace it?
Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this article. My short
answers are as follows. First, it is worth saving managed care because the
concept is sound and the implementation failures can be addressed. Second,
the industry needs to reverse its “just say no” strategy and embrace public
accountability. This would include a strong, expedient, and independent
grievance process to resolve challenges to delayed or denied care. Individual
MCOs should also welcome a patient advisory board with meaningful
oversight of cost containment strategies, along with providing a patients’ rights
advocate. Above all, the managed care industry needs to educate patients and
physicians about why cost control is imperative and how cost containment
decisions are made.87
As for the future, let me note that the cost-quality-access tradeoffs at the
heart of managed care will remain regardless of what replaces it. Whatever
replaces managed care will confront the same policy conflicts present at the
dawn of the managed care era—patient demands for access to increasingly
expensive care and insurer demands to control those very costs. At present,
there is no obvious successor waiting to take managed care’s place. Shifting to
a fully private system is as unlikely as replacing managed care with universal
health coverage. All indications are that, in the short-term, more and more of
the health insurance burden will be shifted to individuals. Employers are
shifting from defined benefit to defined contribution programs, which will
increase employees’ out-of-pocket health care expenditures.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have taken a somewhat irreverent look at the current state
of the health care delivery system in the United States, but this parlous
situation is a very serious matter. For health care affects all of us, and the
current sturm und drang is unsettling for all but the wealthiest citizens who can
still afford private health insurance. Whether it is the high cost of health care
or the absence of health insurance, something is terribly amiss in the system.
My fear is that it will get much worse before the political system will be forced
to develop solutions.

86. In this sense, the managed care industry most resembles the Ottoman Empire during its
decline at the beginning of the 20th century when it was widely referred to as “the sick man of
Europe.” See LORD KINROSS, OTTOMAN CENTURIES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH
EMPIRE (1977).
87. As one participant in the Symposium noted: managed care was designed to ration health
care, but never told the public how it would be done. Now that we know, we don’t like it!

